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Humans can acquire the statistical features of the external world and employ them to
control behaviors. Some external events occur in harmony with an agent’s action, and
thus, humans should also be able to acquire the statistical features between an action
and its external outcome. We report that the acquired action-outcome statistical features
alter the visual appearance of the action outcome. Pressing either of two assigned
keys triggered visual motion whose direction was statistically biased either upward or
downward, and observers judged the stimulus motion direction. Points of subjective
equality (PSE) for judging motion direction were shifted repulsively from the mean of
the distribution associated with each key. Our Bayesian model accounted for the PSE
shifts, indicating the optimal acquisition of the action-effect statistical relation. The PSE
shifts were moderately attenuated when the action-outcome contingency was reduced.
The Bayesian model again accounted for the attenuated PSE shifts. On the other hand,
when the action-outcome contiguity was reduced, the PSE shifts were greatly attenuated,
and however, the Bayesian model could not accounted for the shifts. The results indicate
that visual appearance can be modified by prediction based on the optimal acquisition of
action-effect causal relation.
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INTRODUCTION
Humans can acquire statistical features of external events and
use them to accommodate their behaviors. For example, statis-
tical features in temporal (Miyazaki et al., 2006a; Acerbi et al.,
2012) and spatial (Tassinari et al., 2006; Vilares et al., 2012)
sensory stimuli can be acquired, and the acquired statistical fea-
tures significantly alter manual responses in sensorimotor tasks.
Moreover, acquiring statistical features for the temporal aspect of
sensory signals can also affect temporal order judgments for the
signals (Miyazaki et al., 2006b; Nagai et al., 2012; Yamamoto et al.,
2012). These results suggest that the brain can use the acquired
statistical features as prior knowledge about the external world to
choose and execute appropriate responses to the world.
Such prior knowledge about the world can also alter visual
perception (Freeman, 1994). For example, implicit prior knowl-
edge about the position of a light source can affect the perception
of three-dimensional surface shapes (Mamassian and Goutcher,
2001; Adams et al., 2004; Gerardin et al., 2010) [see Kersten et al.
(2006) for a review]. Prior knowledge that affects the perception
of the world can also be optimally learned (Orban et al., 2006).
Some visual events are caused by an agent’s action. For exam-
ple, we see a line being drawn on paper with the stroke of a pen.
We obviously have prior knowledge about the relation between
the action (i.e., drawing) and its outcome (a drawn line). So far,
researchers (Körding andWolpert, 2004) have focused on how the
prior knowledge between an action and outcome could accom-
modate manual responses in a sensory motor task. On the other
hand, another important question, which has not been addressed,
is whether the acquisition of statistical relationships between an
action and its outcome influence the interpretation of action out-
come. In addition, it was also an open question whether such
acquisition of action-effect statistical relationships was statisti-
cally optimal. In this work, three experiments were conducted to
resolve these issues.
EXPERIMENT 1
BACKGROUND
The purpose of this experiment was to explore whether the acqui-
sition of the statistical relation between an action and its outcome
would distort the interpretation of the action outcome. Observers
were asked to press assigned keys to trigger a drifting grating as
an action outcome on a CRT display. The task of the observers
was to report whether motion direction was upward or down-
ward. As depicted in Figure 1, we spatially superimposed upward
and downward drifting gratings andmanipulated their luminance
contrast (e.g., when the contrast of an upward grating was ω, the
contrast for a downward grating was 1-ω). It was expected that
judged motion direction in the superimposed grating would be
consistent with the motion direction of the component drifting
grating having stronger luminance contrast (Figure 1A, see also
Movies 1 and 2). We also expected that a superimposed grating,
where each component grating has the contrast of 0.5 would likely
result in an ambiguous judgment of motion direction (Figure 1B,
see also Movie 3). In the experiment, the luminance contrast in
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the superimposed drifting grating was dependent on which keys
the observers pressed. For example, when the observers pressed
left and right keys (though a reverse key mapping was also tested),
the relative contrast of each component grating was chosen from
a Gaussian distribution (i.e., prior distribution) where its mean
was biased so that the downward grating on average had lower
and higher relative contrast than the upward grating (Figure 2A).
If the observers could really learn the statistical relation between
key press and visual motion direction, the point of subjective
equality (PSE) for motion direction would be biased repulsively
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustrations of grating stimuli used in
experiments. (A) When a high contrast upward (downward) grating is
superimposed on a low-contrast downward (upward) grating, a percept of
an upward (downward) grating results in. (B) If the contrast of an upward
grating is equivalent to the one of a downward grating, a grating with
ambiguous motion direction is perceived.
from the mean of the prior distribution that was associated
with either key. Moreover, employing a computational model
based on Bayesian statistics, we tested whether the acquisition of
action-effect statistical relation was statistically optimal.
METHODS
Observers
Ten naive people (6 females and 4 males) served as observers.
They reported they had normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity. They were paid 1000 JPY for their participation. Ethical
approval for this study was obtained from the ethical com-
mittee at Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT
Communication Science Laboratories Ethical Committee). The
experiments were conducted according to the principles laid
down in the Helsinki Declaration. Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants in this study.
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a 21-inch CRTmonitor (GDM-F500R,
Sony) with the resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels (38 × 30 cm)
and refresh rate of 100Hz. A photometer (OP200-E, Cambridge
Research Systems) linearized the luminance emitted from the
monitor in a range from 0 to 106 cd/m2. A computer (Mac Pro,
Apple) controlled stimulus generation, stimulus presentation,
and data collection. Stimuli were generated by using MATLAB
and PsychToolBox 3 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).
Stimuli
We used horizontally oriented sinusoidal drifting gratings
as stimuli (Figure 1). Each grating was windowed by a
two-dimensional Gaussian function with the standard deviation
FIGURE 2 | (A) Distributions of luminance contrast for downward (and
upward) drifting gratings in upward (blue, open disk maskers) and
downward (red, open square markers) bias conditions. The mean of the
distribution is deviated from 0.5 by 0.06 negatively and positively for
upward- and downward-bias conditions. The standard deviation of the
distribution was 0.06. (B) The proportion of trials wherein drifting
direction was reported to be downward as a function of the luminance
contrast of a downward grating in Experiment 1. (C) Individual and
group data of empirical PSEs in Experiment 1. (D) Mean ideal and
empirical PSEs in Experiment 1.
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of 3.58 degrees of visual angle. The spatial frequency of the grat-
ings was 0.22 cycles per degree. Each of eight frames of drifting
gratings lasted for 100msec. Because no temporal interval was
inserted between successive frames, the whole drifting-grating
presentation lasted for 800msec. The phase of the grating was
shifted upward/downward by 0.5π per frame, and thus, drift-
ing frequency was 2.5Hz. The drifting speed was 11.2◦/s. In the
upward-bias condition, the contrast of a downward grating was
chosen from the following alternatives: 0.29, 0.32, 0.35, 0.38, 0.41,
0.44, 0.47, 0.50, 0.53, 0.56, and 0.59, which were presented 2, 6, 12,
24, 36, 40, 36, 24, 12, 6, and 2 out of 200 trials, respectively, (see
Figure 2A for the contrast relationship between the upward- and
downward-bias conditions). The frequency of trials as a function
of the contrast of a downward grating followed a Gaussian distri-
bution with a mean of -0.06 and a standard deviation of 0.06. In
the downward-bias condition, the contrast of a downward grat-
ing was chosen from the following alternatives: 0.41, 0.44, 0.47,
0.50, 0.53, 0.56, 0.59, 0.62, 0.65, 0.68, 0.71, which were presented
2, 6, 12, 24, 36, 40, 36, 24, 12, 6, and 2 out of 200 trials, respec-
tively (Figure 2A). The frequency of trials as a function of the
contrast of a downward grating followed a Gaussian distribution
with a mean of 0.06 and a standard deviation of 0.06. In each
condition, values after subtracting the contrast of the downward
grating from 1 were given as the luminance contrast of an upward
grating. The downward grating was superimposed on the upward
grating. Consequently, the superimposed grating was presented
to the observer as a stimulus.
Procedure
Participants sat 70 cm from the CRT display. In each trial, they
were asked to press one of two keys (“Z” and “M”) with the
index finger of the left and right hands, respectively. They were
allowed to freely choose the key to press on their own. Pressing
the key triggered the drifting grating in the display. For half of
the observers, left and right keys produced the drifting grating
with the relative contrast chosen from alternatives in the upward-
and downward-bias conditions, respectively, and the reverse was
true for the other half. The observers were asked to pay attention
to the drifting grating, and after the disappearance of a drifting
grating, to judge direction in which (upward or downward) the
drifting grating moved. They pressed “T” and “V” keys when
they saw upward and downward motion, respectively. No feed-
back was given to the observers. Digits were provided at the left
and right bottom of the display to help the observers notice the
number of trials in which they pressed “Z” and “M” keys. It took
30–40min for each observer to complete an experimental session,
which consisted of 400 trials. The order of trials was randomized.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We calculated the proportion of trials in which downward
motion was perceived as a function of the relative contrast of
the downward-drifting grating, and averaged the proportion
across observers (Figure 2B). We individually fitted a cumulative
Gaussian function to the proportion data and computed the
relative contrast causing 50% responses of downward motion
as an empirical PSE for motion direction (Empirical PSE in
Figure 2C). Consequently, the PSE was significantly different
between upward- and downward-bias conditions [t(9) = 3.22,
p < 0.011, Cohen’s d = 0.57]. Next, we tried to assess the differ-
ence between empirical and ideal PSEs. In a way similar to previ-
ous studies (Miyazaki et al., 2006a,b; Nagai et al., 2012; Yamamoto
et al., 2012), we used a Bayesian model (see Appendix for the
detail of the model) to estimate the ideal PSEs on the basis of the
Bayesian statistics. Using the empirical and ideal PSEs as plotted
in Figure 2D, we conducted a mixed two-way repeated measures
ANOVA with the data source (model and empirical observers) as
a between-subject factor and bias direction (upward and down-
ward) as a within-subject factor. The main effect of the data
source was not significant [F(1, 18) = 0.000, p = 0.98]. On the
other hand, the main effect of bias direction was highly significant
[F(1, 9) = 55.131, p < 0.0001]. Interaction between the two fac-
tors was also significant [F(1, 18) = 5.877, p < 0.03]. Simple main
effect of the data source was still not significant in the upward
[F(1, 18) = 0.420, p > 0.05] and downward [F(1, 18) = 0.378, p >
0.05] bias conditions. Simple main effect of the bias direction
was significant in the empirical [F(1, 18) = 12.504, p < 0.03] and
ideal [F(1, 18) = 48.505, p < 0.03] observers. The results suggest
that the human brain can acquire the statistical relation between
an action and its outcome in a statistically optimal manner, and
consequently alter the judgment for the appearance of the action
outcome.
EXPERIMENT 2
BACKGROUND
The acquisition of an action-outcome relation will be strongly
attenuated when the prior distribution (i.e., the Gaussian distri-
bution of a relative contrast in a superimposed grating) is wide,
consistent with a previous study (Miyazaki et al., 2006a). To con-
firm this prediction, using a new group of 10 observers (5 females
and 5 males), we tested whether the PSE shift as observed in
experiment 1 is reduced when the standard deviation of the prior
distribution is increased from 0.06 to 0.15. (compare Figure 2A
with Figure 3A). Except for the standard deviation manipulation,
the stimuli and procedure were identical to those in experiment 1.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We calculated the proportion of trials in which downwardmotion
was perceived as a function of the contrast of the grating with
a downward motion (Figure 3B), and calculated the empirical
PSE as we did in experiment 1 (Figure 3C). The PSE was not
significantly different between the two bias conditions [t(9) =
0.92, p = 0.38]. To check the difference in the PSE between
Experiments 1 and 2, we conducted a two-way mixed repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with distribution width
as a between-subject factor and bias direction as a within-
subject factor. The main effect of the distribution width was
not significant [F(1, 18) = 0.018, p = 0.89]. The main effect of
the bias direction was significant [F(1, 18) = 9.338, p < 0.007].
Interaction between the two factors was marginally significant
[F(1, 18) = 3.083, p < 0.097]. Based on the outcome of t-test and
ANOVA, we suggest that the PSE shifts based on the acquisi-
tion of action-effect relations are moderated with a larger width
of the prior distribution. To check whether the Bayesian model
could account for the attenuation of the PSE shifts, we assessed
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Distributions of luminance contrast for downward (and
upward) drifting gratings in upward (blue, open disk maskers) and
downward (red, open square markers) bias conditions. The mean of the
distribution is deviated from 0.5 by 0.06 negatively and positively for
upward- and downward-bias conditions. The standard deviation of the
distribution was 0.15. (B) The proportion of trials wherein drifting
direction was reported to be downward as a function of the luminance
contrast of a downward grating in Experiment 2. (C) Individual and
group data of empirical PSEs in Experiment 2. (D) Mean ideal and
empirical PSEs in Experiment 2.
the statistical difference between ideal and empirical PSEs. Using
the empirical and ideal PSEs as plotted in Figure 3D, we con-
ducted a mixed two-way repeated measures ANOVA with the
data source (model and empirical observers) as a between-subject
factor and bias direction (upward and downward) as a within-
subject factor. The main effect of the data source was not signifi-
cant [F(1, 18) = 0.886, p = 0.3590]. On the other hand, the main
effect of bias direction was highly significant [F(1, 9) = 12.193,
p < 0.0026]. Interaction between the two factors was significant
only marginally [F(1, 18) = 3.403, p < 0.082]. The acquisition of
the action-effect relation was not removed but attenuated with
the large standard deviation of the prior distribution while our
Bayesian model could account for the magnitude of the atten-
uation. Taken together, the results again indicate the optimal
acquisition of the action-effect statistical relation.
EXPERIMENT 3
BACKGROUND
An external event is recognized as the outcome of one’s own
action when a temporal discrepancy between the action and the
event is small (Berberian et al., 2012; Kawabe et al., 2013). An
association between an action and its outcome is also estab-
lished depending strongly on the temporal contiguity between
them (Elsner and Hommel, 2004). Moreover, it is known that
one critical determinant of associative learning is the temporal
contiguity between the response and outcome (Wasserman and
Miller, 1997). On the basis of these lines of evidence, we predicted
that inserting a delay between an action and outcomemight ham-
per the acquisition of an action-outcome statistical relation even
when the prior distribution is sufficiently narrow because the
delayed event following an agent’s action is possibly no longer an
action outcome for the brain (Berberian et al., 2012; Kawabe et al.,
2013). Using a completely new group of 10 observers (6 females
and 4 males), we examined whether human observers can acquire
an action-effect statistical relation (Figure 4A) even when a 2-s
delay is inserted between action and outcome.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We calculated the proportion of trials in which downwardmotion
was perceived as a function of the contrast of the grating with a
downward motion (Figure 4B) and calculated the empirical PSE
as we did in experiment 1 (Figure 4C). As a result, we found that
the PSE was not significantly different between the two bias con-
ditions [t(9) = 0.22, p = 0.83]. To check the difference in the PSE
between Experiments 1 and 3, we conducted a two-way mixed
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with action-
effect delay (i.e., the delay was absent in Experiment 1 while
was present in Experiment 3) as a between-subject factor and
bias direction as a within-subject factor. The main effect of the
presence/absence of the action-effect delay was not significant
[F(1, 18) = 0.002, p = 0.96]. The main effect of the bias direc-
tion was significant [F(1, 18) = 6.647, p < 0.019]. Interaction
between the two factors was significant [F(1, 18) = 5.117, p <
0.04]. Simple main effect of the bias condition was significant
only when there was no delay between action and outcome (i.e., in
Experiment 1) [F(1, 18) = 11.421, p < 0.004], but not when there
was an action-outcome delay (i.e., in Experiment 3) [F(1, 18) =
0.050, p = 0.82]. These results indicate that inserting a delay
between action and outcome causes the significant attenuation
in the acquisition of action-effect statistical relation. To see the
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Distributions of luminance contrast for downward (and
upward) drifting gratings in upward (blue, open disk maskers) and
downward (red, open square markers) bias conditions. The mean of the
distribution is deviated from 0.5 by 0.06 negatively and positively for
upward- and downward-bias conditions. The standard deviation of the
distribution was 0.06. (B) The proportion of trials wherein drifting
direction was reported to be downward as a function of the luminance
contrast of a downward grating in Experiment 3. (C) Individual and
group data of empirical PSEs in Experiment 3. (D) Mean ideal and
empirical PSEs in Experiment 3.
relation between ideal and empirical PSEs, we assessed the sta-
tistical difference between them. Using the empirical and ideal
PSEs as plotted in Figure 4D, we conducted a mixed two-way
repeated measures ANOVA with the data source (model and
empirical observers) as a between-subject factor and bias direc-
tion (upward and downward) as a within-subject factor. Themain
effect of the data source was not significant [F(1, 18) = 0.001,
p = 0.9711]. On the other hand, the main effect of bias direction
was highly significant [F(1, 9) = 52.314, p < 0.0000]. Interaction
between the two factors was highly significant [F(1, 18) = 46.369,
p < 0.0001]. Simple main effect of the bias direction was signifi-
cant for the ideal PSEs [F(1, 18) = 98.593, p < 0.0001], but not for
the empirical PSEs [F(1, 18) = 0.090, p < 0.07681]. The Bayesian
model predicted the significant difference in the PSEs between
two bias conditions while empirical data demonstrated that the
PSEs were not different between the two conditions. To sum
up, these results indicate the following two points; first, acquir-
ing an action-outcome relation is strongly reduced when a large
delay is inserted between an action and its outcome, and second,
the large delay between action and outcome hinders the optimal
acquisition of action- outcome statistical relationship. It has been
suggested that a 2-s delay is sufficient to greatly reduce the sense
of agency (or sense of causality) for external events (Berberian
et al., 2012; Kawabe et al., 2013). Because an agent does not likely
consider the event (i.e., drifting grating) as a causal outcome of
her/his action when delay is inserted between an action and its
outcome, only a weak acquisition of an action-outcome relation
possibly results in.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Consistent with previous studies (Körding and Wolpert, 2004),
we observed that the human observers can optimally acquire
the action-effect relationship. On the other hand, we recently
found that the acquisition of an action-effect relation has a side
effect: visual interpretation of action outcome is strongly modu-
lated by the acquired relation between an action and its outcome.
However, the acquisition effect on the interpretation of action
outcome was moderately attenuated when the width of the dis-
tribution to be acquired was large, and moreover, was greatly
attenuated when there was a temporal delay between the action
and its effect. These results indicate that the acquisition of a sta-
tistical relation between an action and its outcome clearly depends
on the consistency (experiment 2) and contiguity (experiment 3)
between action and its effect.
It is already known that acquiring the statistical relation
between visual events strongly alters the perception of motion
direction (Gekas et al., 2013). Moreover, it has been shown that
motion direction perception is strongly affected by an action-
effect relation that is naturally acquired through one’s develop-
ment (Wohlschläger, 2000; Maruya et al., 2007). Beyond these
studies, the present study suggests that such modulation of visual
motion perception by action occurs as a result of motion pre-
diction from the acquired statistical relation between an action
and its outcome. A previous study (Jordan and Hunsinger, 2008)
has reported that the learned pattern of action outcome can
enhance the forward mislocalization of a moving target, but
it did not address the statistical aspects of the action-outcome
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relation. We suggest that the successful acquisition of an action-
outcome’s statistical relationship can trigger the prediction for
visual motion direction that is associated with action, and con-
sequently alter the appearance of visual motion, while it is still
unclear whether perceptual bias or response bias is triggered by
the action-related prediction of visual motion. Anyway, we spec-
ulate that spontaneous cortical activities, which are promising
neural correlates of prior representation (Berkes et al., 2011; De
Lange et al., 2013), possibly mediate the expectation for motion
direction on the basis of an action-outcome relationship.
An intriguing future issue is whether an endogenous action
is a necessary factor for acquiring the action-outcome statistical
relation. In learning the relation between action and its out-
come, endogenous and exogenous actions respectively, contribute
to ideomotor and sensorimotor learnings (Herwig et al., 2007;
Herwig and Waszak, 2012). In particular, endogenous action
seems to trigger a long-term association between an action and its
outcome. In this respect, an endogenous action may be an impor-
tant factor for efficiently learning the action-effect statistical
relation. On the other hand, another line of research has demon-
strated that human observers can learn the statistical relationship
between spatial cues and a tactile temporal order judgment with-
out executing any action (Nagai et al., 2012), suggesting that the
statistical relation between external events can be acquired if sub-
jective causality is established between two events. In the present
study, we found that the acquisition of action-outcome statistical
relation deteriorates when the congruency and temporal con-
tiguity between action and outcome, which presumably play a
fundamental role in causality perception, are reduced (Hume,
1888; Wegner, 2005; Woods et al., 2012; Kawabe, 2013; Kawabe
et al., 2013). Thus, it is also possible that the perception of causal-
ity between an action and its outcome is one of the decisive
factors for the acquisition of their statistical relation. Other lines
of evidence have suggested that causality inference between events
plays critical roles in the optimal integration of cross-sensory
signals (Körding et al., 2007; Sato et al., 2007; Berniker and
Körding, 2011). As such, we suggest that the perception of causal-
ity between an action and its outcome at least partly underlies
the acquisition of the statistical relation between them, though
we need to empirically dissociate the contribution of action from
non-action factors to the acquisition of an action-effect relation.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online
at: http://www.frontiersin.org/Human_Neuroscience/10.3389/
fnhum.2013.00610/abstract
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APPENDIX
We checked whether the acquisition of the action-outcome rela-
tion was statistically optimal. In a way similar to previous studies
(Miyazaki et al., 2006a,b; Nagai et al., 2012; Yamamoto et al.,
2012), we used a Bayesian model, where the probability of possi-
ble true motion direction dtrue given the sensed motion direction
dsensed is expressed as
p(dtrue|dsensed) = pprior(dtrue)p(dsensed|dtrue)/p(dsensed) (1)
where dsensed denotes the sensory measurement of the true
motion direction that distributes in a Gaussian manner with a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of σsensed, and the pprior
(dtrue) denotes the prior distribution for motion direction, which
follows a Gaussian distribution expressed as
pprior(dtrue) = G
(
dtrue;μprior, σprior
)
(2)
where μprior = ±0.06 in terms of the contrast of a downward
drifting grating, and σprior = 0.06 in experiments 1 and 3 and
0.15 in experiment 2. Finally, the motion direction is optimally
estimated so as to maximize the left side term p(dtrue|dsensed) in
(1). Here, optimal judgment on motion direction is based on the
weighted sum of μprior and dsensed, which is expressed as
djudged = (1 − ω)μprior + ωdsensed (3)
where
ω = σ2prior/
(
σ2prior + σ2sensed
)
(4)
Moreover, a perceptual bias in vertical motion direction has been
reported, which likely occurs independently from the weighted
sum described above (Gros et al., 1998; Naito et al., 2010). We
believed we should consider this factor of perceptual bias in our
model. The perceptual bias βwas calculated by averaging the devi-
ations of PSEs from 0.5 in both upward and downward direction
conditions. Thus, the final estimate of perceived motion direction
is expressed as
djudged = (1 − ω)μprior + ωdsensed + β (5)
βs in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 were 0.020 (SEM: 0.019), 0.02
(SEM: 0.009), and 0.018 (SEM: 0.015), respectively. The positive
βs indicate a consistent bias toward upward motion reports.
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